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Fear that such a rule may have the effect of destroying
the finality of judgments and injuriously affecting rights
of innocent third persons which may intervene between the
erroneous decision and the recall of the remittitur, may be
obviated by the recognition of the validity of any rights
of innocent third parties which have intervened. Under
this rule a court would not be faced with the unhappy dilemma of seeing justice thwarted because of its impotency
to correct an error for which it alone is responsible.
I would permit the decision of the District Court of Appeal recalling the remittitur in this case to stand, to the
end that it may reconsider and decide the case anew on
its own merits.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 17,
1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.
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W. F. CONNER et al., Respondents, v. SOUTHERN P ACIFIC COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Appellants.
[1] Railroads-Injuries From Operation-Questions of Law and
Fact.-In action for wrongful death arising out of collision of
train with a towed automobile which the deceased was steering,
questions whether the railroad was negligent in the circumstances, whether any such negligence was a proximate cause
of the accident, and whether the deceased was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to cause the accident,
were properly left to the jury.
[2] Automobiles- Instructions-Contributory Negligence-Operator of Towed Vehicle.-In action for wrongful death of the
operator of a towed automobile, the court is not bound to
give an instruction that one guiding a towed vehicle has less
control over its progress than does the driver of the towing
vehicle, where no such instruction was requested; moreover,
such fact is obvious without an instruction declaring it.
[3] Id.- Instructions- Contributory Negligence- Operator of
Towed Vehicle.-In action for the wrongful death of the operMcK. Dig. References: [1] Railroads, § 121(1); [2, 3] Automoblies, § 343-1; [4] Railroads, § 122(9); [5, 6] New Trial, § 124;
[7] Railroads, §86(2); [8] Automobiles, § 139-1.
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ator of a towed vehicle, it is proper to instruct the jury that
they must determine whether deceased exercised the care and
vigilance for his own safety which the circumstances required;
that negligence is always a relative question, relative to the
circumstances of the time, of the place, and of the person or
persons; and that the person in charge of the towed vehicle
is bound to exercise reasonable care for his own safety in
steering or operating it.
Railroads-Injuries From Operation-Instructions.-In action
for wrongful death arising out of collision of train with a
towed automobile which the deceased was steering, instructions that the deceased should have exercised reasonable care
in the circumstances in which he was, and that it was for the
jury to decide whether he could and should have done anything
more than let himself be pulled slowly into the path of the
approaching train, are not erroneous in law or misleading
in fact.
New Trial-Errors Relating to Instructions-Discretion-Review.-Whether instructions which are actually erroneous are
cured by other correct instructions, or are prejudicial is a
question for the discretion of the trial court; but where the
instructions are correct, there is no basis for the exercise of
discretion, and no legal ground in that respect on which a new
trial may be granted.
!d.-Errors Relating to Instructions-Discretion-Review.An inquiry as to whether instructions are erroneous presents
purely a question of law, and if it appears on appeal that a
trial court in granting a new trial based its order exclusively
on an erroneous concept of legal principles applicable to the
cause, its order will be reversed.
Railroads-Injuries From Operation-Contributory Negligence
-Care at Crossings.-One sitting behind a steering wheel of
a towed automobile which was struck by a train at a railroad
crossing was not "utterly helpless" as a matter of law to
alter the course of the towing and towed vehicles where there
is evidence that his car was equipped with steering gear, brakes
and horn, and that before the vehicles went on the tracks
they were going so slowly and up such a grade that he, by applying his brakes, could have stopped both of them in safety.
Automobiles-Contributory Negligence-Operator of Towed
Vehicle.-The limited ability of one at the wheel of a towed
vehicle to control its travel does not justify his depending
entirely, as might a mere passenger, on the vigilance of the
driver of the towing car; he must exercise ordinary care in
watching for traffic, railway trains, etc., in the control of his

[5] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, §92; Am.Jur., New Trial, §117;

__________.......
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own car to a reasonable extent, in sounding his horn to warn
the driver of the towing vehicle if such action appears reasonably necessary, and, in case of slow speed conditions, in leaving
the towed car if reasonably necessary.

.APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tehama
County granting a new trial. .Arthur Coats, Judge.* Reversed .
.Action for damages for wrongful death.
plaintiffs a new trial, reversed.

Order granting

Glenn D. Newton for .Appellants .
.Alfred E. Frazier and Duard F. Geis for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Defendants appeal from an order granting plaintiffs' motion for new trial in an action for wrongful death. The motion was granted for asserted error in
instructions. We have concluded that the jury were correctly instructed. It necessarily follows that the trial court's
order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial
cannot be sustained.
Bill Conner, plaintiffs' son, was killed when defendants'
train struck an automobile which was being steered by Conner while in tow of a pickup truck driven by Richard Benson. Benson drove upgrade at a speed of about five miles
an hour across defendants' tracks and did not see the train
until it was too late for him to accelerate and pull Conner's
car off the tracks. Visibility was good and both drivers
were familiar with the crossing. There is evidence from
which the jury could, and its verdict implies that it did,
:find that, had Conner kept a lookout for his own safety,
he would have seen the train1 and could have signaled to
Benson and thereby caused the latter to avoid the accident
or he could have escaped from the towed car before it was
struck; also, the evidence would support a finding that Conner by seasonably applying his brakes after he was in a
position to see the oncoming train could have stopped both
vehicles before even the towing car went upon the crossing.
*Assigned by Chainnan of Judicial Council.
The track to the. north, from which direction the train approached,
was straight and the view unobstructed for at least a mile from the
point, approximately 60 feet from the tracks, where Benson slowed to
a speed of about five miles per hour preparatory to crossing the tracks.
1
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The trial court instructed the jury that Benson was guilty
of negligence as a matter of law. 2 [1] The questions whether
the railroad was negligent in the circumstances, whether any
such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, and
whether Conner (the deceased) was guilty of negligence
which proximately contributed to cause the accident, were
left to the jury. rrhis (at least as against plaintiff) was proper,
and the instructions upon which such issues were submitted
were not erroneous.
The jury were told that ''A traveler approaching a rail"
way crossing with the intent of crossing thereover on a
public highway is required, if he does not stop, to approach the tracks with his vehicle under control so as not
to render ineffective other precautions required of him, such
as looking and listening for the approach of a train, and
so that he may be able to stop or turn aside while still
in a position of safety upon ascertaining that a train is approaching which might endanger his passage over said track";
and that he must yield the right of way to an approaching
train.
[2] The principal argument of the plaintiffs is to the
effect that no instruction expressly directed the attention
of the jury to the fact-or instructed them that as a matter of law it is a fact-that one guiding a towed vehicle has
less control over its progress than does the driver of the
to·wing vehicle. Whether, under the circumstances here,
such an instruction on that proposition of fact would have
been proper is beside the point; no such instruction was requested and the · court was not bound to so instruct of its
own motion. Moreover, the fact is obvious without an instruction declaring it. [3] As to the applicable law the
jury were properly informed that they must determine whether
deceased ''exercised the care and vigilance for his own safety
which the circumstances required''; that negligence is '' always a relative question-relative to the circumstances of the
time, of the place, and of the person or persons''; that ''The
person in charge of the towed vehicle is bound to exercise
reasonable care for his own safety in steering or operating
it. Whether proper care has been exercised is a matter
to be determined according to the facts of the particular
2
Because of our conclusion that there is no error adverse to plaintiffs in the instructions we do not need to consider whether upon undisputed evidence decedent, like Benson, was as a matter of law guilty
of negligence which proximately contributed to his death.
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case.'' The above quoted instructions correctly and adequately informed the jury as to the duty of care of one
in the position of deceased. The record discloses no basis
for a determination that the jury did not follow such instructions in arriving at their verdict.
[ 4] The court appears to have granted the new trial
because it decided that the jury were misled by its instructions, which, it concluded, did not sufficiently emphasize the
factual proposition that Conner had less opportunity to
control the vehicles than did Benson. But the instructions
are not erroneous in law or misleading in fact. They correctly informed the jury that Conner should have exercised
reasonable care in the circumstances in which he was, and
left it to the jury to decide whether he could and should
have done anything more than let himself be pulled slowly
into the path of the approaching train. [5] Whether instructions which are actually erroneous are cured by other,
correct instructions or are prejudicial is a question for the
discretion of the trial court (Fennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. (1938), 10 Cal.2d 538, 544 [76 P.2d 104]) but where,
as here, the instructions are correct, there is no basis for
the exercise of discretion, and no legal ground, in that respect, on which a new trial may be granted (Parker v. Womack
(1951), 37 Cal.2d 116, 123 [230 P.2d 823]). [6] The inquiry as to whether instructions are erroneous presents purely
a question of law (Dodds v. Gifford (1932), 127 Cal.App.
629, 634 [16 P.2d 279]; Markham v. Hancock Oil Go. (1934),
2 Cal.App.2d 392, 395 [37 P.2d 1087]) and if it appears on
appeal that a trial court in granting a new trial based its
order exclusively upon an erroneous concept of legal principles applicable to the cause, its order will be reversed
(Estate of Baird (1926), 198 Cal. 490, 507 [246 P. 324]).
Plaintiffs rely on the statement, quoted with approval
from 3 Cal.Jur. 854, in Marchetti v. Southern Pac. Co. (1928),
204 Cal. 679, 683 [269 P. 529], that "a passenger in a machine operated by another cannot be said as a matter of
law to have been negligent in not calling the chauffeur's
attention to the danger of a collision.'' The statement has
no application here. Conner was not a passenger and the
question of his contributory negligence was one of fact.
[7] In Pairman v. Mars (1942), 55 Cal.App.2d 216, 219220 [130 P.2d 448], it was said that "One sitting behind a
steering wheel of a towed car is utterly helpless so far as
directing the course or conduct of such car." This state-
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ment, in its application to the facts of this case, obviously
is incorrect. The record here shows that Conner's car was
equipped with steering gear, brakes and horn. There is
evidence that before the towing and towed vehicles went
upon the tracks they were going so slowly and up such a
grade that Conner, by apply}ng his brakes, could have
stopped both of them in safety. 3 Furthermore, he was not
as a matter of law "utterly helpless" to alter the course
of the vehicles. (See Farrar v. Whipple (1924), 65 Cal.App.
123, 126 [223 P. 80], affirming judgment against one whose
negligent steering of a towed vehicle resulted in injury to
others.) [8] The limited ability of one at the wheel of
a towed vehicle to control its travel would not justify his
depending entirely, as might (under some circumstances)
a mere passenger, on the vigilance of the driver of the
towing car. Certainly he would have the duty of exercising ordinary care in watching for traffic, railway trains, etc.,
in the control of his own car to a reasonable extent, in sounding his horn to warn the driver of the towing vehicle if such
action appeared reasonably necessary, and, under the slow
speed conditions shown here, in leaving the towed car if
reasonably necessary.
Since the jury, correctly instructed, impliedly found upon
sufficient evidence that Conner failed to exercise the reasonable care required of one in his position and that his negligence proximately contributed to cause his death, the granting
of a new trial upon the ground designated was error.
For the reasons above stated, the order is reversed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
In a whole series of instructions the jury was told that
the pilot of a car being towed must do all that an operator
of a car must do and more to escape the charge of contributory negligence when he is being towed across a grade
""THE CouRT [to witness Benson] : . . . The question, of course, is
you towing his car and you not putting your brakes on, and he putting
it on, I presume, what distance could he have stopped his car, which
also means stopping yours, too~ A. I guess he could have stopped
in six or seven feet.
"MR. NEWTON [defendants' counsel]: And he didn't give you any
signal to stop as you were going up the grade, did he~ A. No. . ..
'' Q. There is a gradual rise as you leave the highway to approach
the railroad tracks~ A. About a four foot rise from the highway.''
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railroad crossing. The jury was told that more care was
required than of the operator of the towing car, because,
as will later be shown, he was expected to exercise the highest
degree of care. Nevertheless the majority holds that the
instructions were not erroneous and therefore the trial court
was wrong in granting a new trial after verdict for defendant railroad company. It must be remembered that in this
case there are three persons involved. The railroad employees operating the train, Benson, who was driving the
car which was doing the towing, and the deceased, who was
in the towed car. Benson is not a party defendant or plaintiff and any negligence of his is not imputed to the deceased.
Hence, the only instructions pertinent would be those dealing with the situation as between the railroad crew and the
deceased, the occupant of the towed car.
The trial court gave the following instruction (quoted in
the majority opinion) : "A traveler approaching a railway
crossing with the intent of crossing thereover on a public
highway is required, if he does not stop, to approach the
tracks with his vehicle under control so as not to render
ineffective other precautions required of him, such as looking and listening for the approach of a train, and so that
he may be able to stop or turn aside while still in a position
of safety upon ascertaining that a train is approaching
which might endanger his passage over said track." (Italics
added.) (Instruction No. 24.) In addition, the jury was
advised: ''The railway train has the right of way and in
their operation of a train toward and over a crossing, the
trainmen have the right to assume that every person will
approach the crossing exercising ordinary care to avoid collision, and will look and listen for an approaching train
and stop, if necessary, before he or she crosses to let the
train go by." (Instruction No. 17.) "It is the rule in
respect of the right-of-way at a railroad crossing that a
vehicle or person approaching a steam railroad crossing,
with the intention of going over the tracks, is under the
duty to yield the right-of-way at that crossing to any railroad train which may be approaching the crossing." (Italics
added.) (Instruction No. 18.) "You are instructed that
in approaching a railroad crossing, a continuous duty is
imposed upon the driver of an automobile to maintain a
lookout in the directions from which danger is anticipated."
(Instruction No. 19.) "The tracks of a railroad, such as
that involved in this case, are in themselves a warning of
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danger. The view of the tracks and intersection in this
case was unobstructed and under these conditions before
one drives a vehicle into the space which would be occupied
by a train if it were to pass over such tracks, it is his duty
to use every reasonable opportunity to look and listen for
the approach of train, engine or car on the tracks. What
is included in the term 'every reasonable opportunity' depends on all the surrounding circumstances, as they would
be met and viewed by a person of ordinary prudence, if he
occupied the same position as the one whose conduct is in
question." (Instruction No. 23.) Summarized, those instructions informed the jury that plaintiff was in exactly
the same position as the driver of a car, in full control
thereof, approaching a railroad crossing and must do all the
things such a person could do; that the train crew may assume he will look, listen, and if necessary stop ; that he must
yield the right of way to the train, and maintain a continuous
lookout; that by implication he must stop, approach the
crossing with the vehicle under control and be able to stop
or turn aside.
The jury was told in effect that the mere fact alone that
the car is being towed constitutes contributory negligence,
because the things the deceased was required to do could
be done only by someone who was operating the towing car.
It should be obvious that when a person is in control of
a car being towed he is practically helpless. He cannot stop
or swerve and thus cannot yield the right of way. To
expect him to look and listen is also unreasonable. All
his attention must be focused on the towing operation if
he is to avoid running into the towing car, fouling the tow
line, or having his car upset. Certainly, he is in a more
helpless position than a passenger in a car. While a passenger may not have a brake at his foot or a steering wheel
in his hand, he can communicate with the driver and inform him of approaching danger. In the instant case to
require the deceased to put on the brake (assuming that
would be safe) would demand making the choice between
his life and that of the driver of the towing car, for otherwise he would stop the towing car in the path of the train.
If he attempted to brake his car the result might well be
to stall the towing car. It is asserted that deceased could
have blown his horn, but there is no showing that the horn
was operating. In any event the driver of the towing car
would not have known of the reason for blowing the horn.
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For the foregoing reasons, judges taking a common sense
view with regard to the operation of a towed car have commented: ''One sitting behind a steering wheel of a towed
car is utterly helpless so far as directing the course or conduct of such car. He is not the driver either in the statutory sense or in any sense. No amount of turning of the
steering wheel by him will alter its course." (Fairman v.
11iot·s, 55 CaLApp.2d 216, 219-220 [130 P.2d 448].)
The effect of the foregoing clearly erroneous instructions
was magnified by another faulty instruction which in effect
told the jury that even slight negligence on decedent's part
would bar recovery; that is to say it was advised that he
was required to use extraordinary care. The instruction
reads : ''Contributory negligence is such an act or omission
of a person killed or injured, amounting to want of ordinary
care in the circumstances of the case, as concurring or cooperation with a negligent act of a defendant, was a proximate cause of the death complained of. If, in this case,
there was any conduct on the part of the person who was
killed, amounting to negligence, no matter how slight, and
if such negligence in any degree proximately contributed
to the injury, no recovery can be had, and it will be your
duty to return a verdict in favor of the defendants." (Italics
added.) (Instruction No. 7.) It is settled that such an
instruction is faulty because it tells the jury that only slight
contributory negligence will bar recovery when it is the degree of contribution that may be slight. It is error to instruct the jury that contributory negligence, no matter how
slight, will bar recovery by plaintiff,· because it is in effect
saying that contributory negligence is not ordinary negligence, which is the doing of. something or the failure to
do something which a reasonably prudent person would or
would not have done under like circumstances. (Clark v.
State of California, 99 Cal.App.2d 616 [222 P.2d 300] ; Strong
v. Sacramento & P. R. R. Co., 61 Cal. 326; Polk v. City of
Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 519 [159 P.2d 931]; Robinson v. Western Pac. R. R. Co., 48 Cal. 409; Rush v. Lagomarsino, 196
Cal. 308 [237 P. 1066] ; Morgan v. Los Angeles R. & G. Corp.,
105 Cal.App. 224 [287 P. 152] .) In Clark v. State of California, supra, the court said: "But appellant more justly
complains of a group of instructions given by the court at
defendants' request which as to the point now under consideration may be summarized as follows: The court told
38 C.2d-21
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the jury that if the decedent was guilty of contributory
negligence, no matter how slight, which proximately contributed to the accident their verdict must be for the defendants. Again the court said that in determining whether
or not decedent was guilty of contributory negligence 'if you
believe from the evidence that she was guilty of the slightest
degree of negligence . . . and that such negligence proximately contributed to the accident and her death' the verdict must be for the defendants. As said by the Supreme
Court of California in Strong v. Sacramento & P. R. R. Co.,
61 Cal. 326, 328: 'The rule is, not that any degree of negligence, however slight, which directly concurs in producing
the injury will prevent a recovery; but, if the negligence
of the plaintiff, amounting to the absence of ordinary care,
shall contribute proximately, in any degree, to the injury,
the plaintiff shall not recover.' . . .
''While the lawyer and also the layman recognize that
there are differing degrees of negligence, here ordinary negligence was the only degree of negligence involved, and to
permit the jury to continue in their mistaken belief that
they were concerned with the degree of negligence as distinguished from the degree of proximate contribution of
that negligence to the happening of the accident and the
infliction of the injury, was detrimental to plaintiff's interests,
to say the least.''
It is conceded by the majority that where instructions
are erroneous the question of prejudice and whether bad
instructions are cured by others is for the discretion of the
trial court on motion for a new trial. (Fennessey v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 10 Cal.2d 538 [76 P.2d 104] ; Mathers v.
Cotmty of Riverside, 22 Cal.2d 781 [141 P.2d 419] ; Brignoli
v. Seaboard Transp. Co., 29 Cal.2d 782 [178 P.2d 445].)
That the jury was misled in the instant case is clear. I
would, therefore, affirm the order granting a new trial.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April17,
1952. Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

